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Liberation, national unity, and the politics of limited reform.
Part I: Italy, 1944-1948.
Italy from the mid to late 1940s provides a classic instance of
a massive uprising by the poorest elements in society in support
of fundamental changes in their condition. The efforts of the
Italian industrial working class and the peasantry through strike
action, land seizures and military action in the Resistance, were
supported by the unions and by the Socialist and Communist
parties. But the political project for fundamental reform was
undermined in the post-liberation settlement. The great wave of
mobilisation generated during the mid-1940s subsided for a
variety of reasons. With its subsidence, the hopes of fundamental
change which had inspired many to risk their lives in the revolt
against fascism and the German occupation declined. Italy's
subsequent history was one of economic growth, but it was
purchased at the expense of basic reforms on the land, in
industry and the state.
Of course things did not go back to where they had stood in 1944.
Conservatives opposed to Fascism formed the Christian Democratic
Party in 1943. They enjoyed enough credibility to assume a
leading position in the anti-fascist coalition which assumed
office once the enfeebled Badoglio government had given way to
a more representative provisional government. The Christian
Democrats (DC) used their authority to consolidate an alliance
which stretched across Italian party politics from the
Resistance, Communists, Socialists and Liberals, to unions and
business associations. The effect of Christian Democratic
hegemony was to undermine the most radical elements in the
coalition. But they made sufficient concessions to pressures for
change from the peasantry and the working class to contain them,
and thus to ensure major continuities with the social, economic
and political status quo ante. These concessions were important
in maintaining their hegemony: each time Christian Democratic
policy shifted markedly to the right they experienced rather
rapid deflations in electoral support.
The war-end
The fall of Mussolini and the collapse of Fascism, the German
occupation and the Allied invasion left a political vacuum in
Italy which a number of parties untainted with fascist
associations attempted to fill. The most important of these were
the Christian Democratic Party, closely associated with the
Church; the Communist Party, closely associated with the
Resistance and with a variety of working class and peasant
movements; and the Socialist and Liberal parties, the latter the
remnant of the pre-Fascist ruling class.
The Resistance must be counted as a political force within these
parties both through its Committees of National Liberation (CLN)
and because of the large number of Communist partisans, though
its political life was short. The Allies had clear plans for
post-war Italy. In the longer run, Italian politics were deeply
marked by the Cold War.
Initially, the Communist Party occupied the centre of the
political forces which emerged in 1944. This was partly
accomplished because Togliatti's strategy placed national unity
in the fight for liberation ahead of and to the exclusion of
reforms in state and economy. This strategy initially won
important benefits for the party. It enabled the party to achieve
a pivotal position within the coalition of forces on which
Italy's provisional government was based. But it also constrained
the party from taking full advantage of the political and
economic upheavals in Italy at the end of the second world war
to push through a programme of reforms, particularly on the land
and in the industrial areas. Its national leaders used their
authority within the unions, and to a lesser extent the
peasantry, to dampen their protests, and to reduce the effects
of these protests on Italian politics. Despite their historical
links within the movements for land reform and the reconstruction
of industry, the Communists came to play a restraining and
conservative role. It was fearful that a radical position might
induce Allied intervention. But it also developed a preference
for electoral over protest politics.
Communist strategy dovetailed with the inter-classism of the
Christian Democrats. As the Christian Democrats consolidated
their position, with considerable help from other conservative
forces in Italy, the Allied occupying forces and later the United
States government, the Communists and Socialists were forced into
opposition, and the reforms in state and economy which they were
distinctively able to identify, and for which the partisans had
made such sacrifices, were dropped from the political agenda of
Italian governments, or displaced by limited reforms which
achieved a degree of social consensus without significantly
changing the major institutions of Italian society. In the longer
run, the need to define a precise programme for reform was
postponed, thus blurring the policy options available to the
left.
Potentially three foci for reform in Italy presented themselves
during the 1940s and the 1950s: the land and industry, both
seething with discontent, and the state. These will be briefly
outlined, and then some attention will be paid to the politics
of the process which began with Mussolini's resignation and
kidnapping on 25 July 1943, and ended with the Christian
Democratic victory in the general election of 1948.
A Political mobilisation
The political and military circumstances of the mobilisation were
crucial factors in shaping its progress. Both peasant and
industrial unrest were exacerbated by Italy's weakening military
situation and the collapse of Mussolini's government. The
wretched conditions of the two elements of the subordinate
classes and strata -- the industrial working class and the
peasantry — provide the setting for the massive upheavals which
commenced even before Mussolini's downfall. The end of fascist
rule changed Italy's relations with Germany from a partner to an
occupied zone. The German presence took the form of an army of
occupation. Working and living conditions worsened dramatically
under the occupation, particularly in industrial areas under
German occupation. Allied bombing of industrial cities
intensified working class misery. The Italian working class
became a source of slave labour. Numbers were deported to Germany
3and eastern Europe. In the countryside the occupying forces
inflicted massacres on the peasantry in reprisals for attacks by
the Resistance.
The mobilisation took three forms: peasant occupations of land,
uprisings by industrial workers against the German occupation,
mainly in Milan, Genoa and Turin, but also in Naples; and a
massive influx of volunteers into the Resistance. The intensity
of the struggle against the German occupation assisted the Allies
considerably, but also induced among them fears that Italian
independence would precipitate a situation comparable to that in
Greece, and require military intervention to contain it. The
insurrections of 1945 in northern industrial cities led to the
fear that a social revolution was imminent.
American and British policy towards Italy diverged somewhat:
British policy was aimed at preventing "epidemics and disorders"
in order to preserve British hegemony in the Mediterranean.
American policy was more subtle but no less interventionist. It
aimed at creating "stability and prosperity", a policy which was
to culminate in the Marshall Plan and blatant interference in the
elections of 1948.
Neither policy was compatible with a strong left, or an armed
populace. The Allies were apprehensive of the Resistance, and
specially the strength of the Communists within its ranks. By
mid-1944 membership in the Resistance had grown to over 80,000,
and at its height reached 100,000. It took an important role in
action against the Germans from mid-1944. In October 1944, the
Allies, facing tough German opposition, decided to suspend the
military offensive in the north until June the following year.
Arguably this decision was based on good military reasoning, but
it had disastrous consequences for the partisans who now faced
the prospect of taking on the Germans on their own. The partisans
went into hiding; even so, many lost their lives.
This military disaster was followed by political defeat late in
194 4 when the CLNA signed the Protocols of Rome
 T in terms of
which they undertook to place themselves under the command of the
Allied Commander-in-Chief, to hand over their arms, and to agree
to disband at the moment of liberation. They were also expected
to place themselves under the command of a regular officer in the
Italian Army. From then on, the partisans became a subordinate
element in the Allied forces, rather than an independent player
in Italian post-war politics.
In April, 1945, partisans were instrumental in the fighting which
ended in the unconditional surrender of the German force
investing Genoa. Later in the month the Turin factory workers
rose in revolt against the Germans in anticipation of the arrival
of a partisan force in the city. But the British advised
partisans in the area that the insurrection was to be postponed.
The Turin factory workers faced the Germans without partisan
help. This was probably the consequence of military incompetency,
but like the events of the previous October, it served further
to marginalise the Resistance.
The Allies saw the partisans as a threat to public order; were
suspicious of their relations with the Communist Party, which
they viewed as a revolutionary party; and were anxious to keep
them (or more specifically their Committees for National
Liberation, the CLN) out of government and politics. Although the
Allies came to appreciate the military assistance of the
partisans as they pushed up the peninsula, they were also anxious
to disarm them and get them back into civilian life as soon as
possible; or to have them enlisted in the Italian army and police
force. Rather than give them a role in the police which
acknowledged them as a distinct entity, the Allies soon after
landing in Sicily, had placed the Carbinieri, a section of the
Italian army, under the control of a force of London policemen.
The policy was maintained after the occupation of Rome. The
partisans were excluded as far as possible from local
administration.*
With the end of Fascism, there was a movement, the epurazione.
to expel fascists from the administration, specially from the
judiciary, army and police forces. In the event, the epurazione
boomeranged on its authors: the main casualties were members of
the Resistance who had joined government service, mainly the
police force and the military, at the end of the war.
The policy of epurazione was partly frustrated by political
antagonisms in the coalition. The assistant commissioner in
charge of "epuration" was the Communist Scoccimarro. The demand
for his resignation by the Liberal premier Bonomi led to the
crisis which broke up the provisional government.
Although senior officials in the Fascist administration were
routinely expelled from their posts as the Allies advanced
through Italy, the CLN often complained that the men replacing
them were also Fascists. The instructions to tribunals which
Count Sforza summarised as "Far presto, colpire in alto,
perdonare in basso" (act quickly, strike the top ones, pardon the
menials") provided a humane net through which many escaped. After
the war, the spirit and letter of the epurazione was reversed,
as courts drew distinctions between "ordinary" torture (which was
condoned) and "particularly atrocious" torture. Of the nearly
400,000 civil servants investigated, only 1,200 were dismissed
or retired early, and 8,000 were reprimanded. As late as the
1960s, all but two out of 64 prefects, the main representatives
of the central government in the provinces, had held appointments
under the fascist regime. The proportion of police chiefs and
deputies who had served in the Fascist administration, was as
high. On taking office in 1948, the Christian Democrats purged
the civil service and the police as part of the general
suppression of left-wing political groups.
The partisan leader, Ferruccio Parri became the leader of the
government of anti-Fascist parties which held office from June
to December 1945. But by then the partisans had all but been
eliminated from significance in the array of forces which were
to preside over post-war Italy. The partisans had a potential
political strength which they were unable to deliver. One reason
why the partisans remained politically weak was their relative
isolation from Italian society. For instance, the Action Party
was a major political force within the Resistance, but had little
1
 The official history of the Allied Administration of Italy
offers some revealing views of the British attitude towards the
partisans. C R S Harris, Allied Military Administration of Italy.
1943-1945, London (HMSO) 1957.
base in the wider society, and managed to gain little more than
1% in the elections to the Constitutional Assembly in 1946.
B) The land 2
As the Germans retreated, peasants occupied land in the more
backward southern regions, where agriculture was dominated by
large estates -- the latifondi -- commonly owned by absentee
landlords. The increasing momentum of the war from mid-1943 had
an effect on peasant activism. Partisan activity led to savage
reprisals against local populations. Peasants bore the bulk of
these attacks. On the other hand, partisans and escaped prisoners
of war ameliorated conditions by exaggerating the records of
their seizures of produce, thus reducing the quantities which
producers were obliged to place in the state granaries. The
Communists (PCI) took a prominent role in peasant land
occupations, and later in the land reform programmes through
which peasants attempted to consolidate the gains they had made.
A Communist with long experience of involvement in peasant
struggles, Fausto Gullo, was made Minister of Agriculture in
Parri's government. This government passed the Legge Gullo which
basically ratified the peasant land occupations. Despite this
lead, however, the peasants tended to vote for the Christian
Democrats, not the Communists.
The protest on the land continued throughout the 1940s. Numbers
of people lost their lives, some at the hands of the police,
others by the Mafia, as in the episode during a demonstration on
a lat if ondo near Palermo on 1 May, 1949 when 25 people were
killed. This episode precipitated the crisis which afforded de
Gasperi the opportunity to resign and form a government which
excluded the left-wing parties.
The struggle for the land intensified after the war. From 1945
till 1948, the land struggles spread to nearly all the regions,
though it remained strongest in the South. Part of the reason for
the intensification of the struggle lay in the dissolution of the
coalition of anti-fascist parties and the formation of a
government based in a coalition of conservative parties in which
the DC assumed the dominant position. The Christian Democrats
became considerably more reliant on the support of large-scale
landowners. In 1949, the peasant movement proclaimed a national
strike in favour of land redistribution and the renegotiation of
land contracts. Industrial workers struck in sympathy with them.
This was the context for the shootings of 1 May and the incident
in Calabria in October in which the police shot and killed a
woman.
In response to the agrarian crisis, the Christian Democrats
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Italian land reform presents a number of similarities to
contemporary industrialising countries. Op cit p 132.
introduced a land reform of their own in 1950, which was partly
based on and partly transcended the Legge Gullo. These reforms,
which Bonnano accurately describes as "partial" were intended
to restore peace in the countryside by making sufficient
concessions to the demands of the peasantry without, however,
alienating the land-owners upon which the DC depended for much
of its support. This was achieved in part by permitting big land-
owners to retain ownership over property in which they had
invested productive resources. As a result, major beneficiaries
were the owners of productive large and middle-sized farms. Hired
labourers and sharecroppers benefitted least of all.
In terms of the land reforms introduced by the the Christian
Democrats, about 29% of the arable land in the country was
expropriated and distributed to 133,000 families (about half a
million people) . The average size of the new farms was six
hectares, often poor in quality, many without any of the
infrastructure which would make them economically viable. However
these measures (reformist rather than reforming), fulfilled the
most potent aspirations of rural Italians to become land-owners.
The limited redistribution which did take place created plots
sufficiently productive to provide a refuge for their occupants
in hard times, when employment in industry was not available. But
this refuge was insufficiently attractive to offer an alternative
to industrial employment when jobs opened up during periods of
economic upswing. It is not fanciful to compare such a system
with a "market-driven" form of apartheid. The reforms were
limited also in the sense that they were largely confined to
redistribution, and touched hardly at all on contracts and other
conditions of employment. Arguably, other beneficiaries of land
reforms were the industrialists and entrepreneurs of the post-
war Italian reconstruction, for whom a more productive and
affluent agricultural sector provided an internal market. The
way in which production was organised encouraged competition
between peasants, making it difficult to maintain high levels of
political mobilisation which might have made it possible for the
initial waves of protest to become translated into effective
political organisation in the countryside. Peasants preferred
individualistic to collectivist strategies in production.
Wretched living conditions and poor communications reinforced the
isolation of peasant communities. Italian peasants might follow
the lead of communists in land occupations, but they tended also
to vote for Christian Democrats or more populist deputies. The
populist party Fronte dell'Uomo Qualanque enjoyed considerable
support in the South in the elections for the Constitutional
Assembly. In the long run, the Christian Democrats were the main
political beneficiaries of the limited land reforms. They
established the basis for a social consensus within the numerous
group of peasants who became land-owners via the reforms.
C. Industrial insurrection
The partisan campaigns against the German forces in the north
were closely intertwined with the seizure of factories in the
northern industrial cities after the Germans had been forced
out. Partisan committees (the CLN ) took control in factories from
which their owners, fearing revolution, had fled. One of the
first decisions the CLN took was to deny owners the right to
dismiss workers. Italian businessmen in the north were
discomforted by the seizures, which they had not anticipated.
They had hoped that there would be a smooth transfer of power to
the Allies; not a repetition of the events of the early 1920s.
The business community soon recovered confidence however, and
developed a strategy which would restore the sovereignty of
capital in Italian industry. Confindustria, the industrial
employers' association, rejected workers' control in the
factories, and wound up the factory CLNs which had taken them
over. The business community claimed the right to hire and fire,
demanding that productivity should be the sole criterion on which
a worker could expect to be kept in his job. During the same
period Confindustria got the unions to accept their demand for
wage agreements which were conditional on the requirement that
factory committees were not to seek improvements beyond those
achieved in national agreements. The CLNAI had set up Councils
of Management which they hoped would become instruments of
workers' control. Employers won an important victory by thwarting
these aspirations. The Councils increasingly became instruments
for enforcing discipline on the shop floor, and were used to
choose which workers would be dismissed.
After benefiting for so long under Fascist intervention, business
rediscovered the principles of the free market, and rejected all
state intervention. Although businessmen had supported the
establishment of the Christian Democratic Party in 1942, they
generally preferred the Liberal Party. However, the Liberals
lived in a world that preceded fascism, and in practice business
was forced to support the DC. In the long run, the peculiar
mixture of paternalism, authoritarianism and limited concessions
to popular demands which made up Christian Democratic ideology
and strategy, worked as well as any to serve capital in one of
the most explosive environments in post-war Europe.
One of the short-term reasons why workers were unable to
consolidate the gains which seemed within their grasp at the war-
end lay in the weakness of the left-wing parties, and specially
the Communists, even when they held office in post-war
government. In particular, the left failed to get government
action on critical social and economic issues, partly because of
a lack of support in the government, and partly because of
resistance from the bureaucracy. Thus despite the wholesale
destruction of housing during the war, government housing policy
produced a dribble of accommodation. The government signally
failed to preserve the currency. Although the much-dreaded
Communist Scoccimarro was Minister of Finance, the government in
1946 permitted businessmen in successful export sectors to sell
a high proportion of the foreign currency they had earned on the
exchange markets. This stimulated speculation in the currency.
Scoccimarro took the opportunity afforded by the introduction of
a new currency to introduce a progressive wealth tax, but the
Treasury impeded, and virtually demolished his policy.
The continuities in the state
The state whose power Mussolini usurped had originally been
modelled on the principle of the rechtstaat. with a highly
centralised, but also inefficient and internally fragmented
bureaucracy which responded more sensitively to party politicians
than to formal rules. Paul Ginsborg described the Italian state
8as an archipelago within which the different islands were
controlled by different interests.3 This combination underlay the
striking feature of the bureaucracy -- its patron-clientelism,
a feature which worked to the advantage of the southern landed
gentry and bourgeoisie: more than half the administrative class
in 1954 came from the south. The judiciary was virtually a closed
caste, a considerable proportion of whom were recruited from the
south. The higher echelons of the judiciary, sitting in Rome,
were especially susceptible to informal political pressures. As
we have seen, its deep hostility to the left and to the
Resistance, eviscerated the epurazione.
Under Fascism the state became a bloated caricature of its
earlier self. Between 1922 and 1940, 260 new government agencies
were formed, many performing overlapping functions. Moreover,
the opportunities for patronage proliferated, not only as a
consequence of the expansion of government, but also because
Mussolini deliberately pitted party officials against state
functionaries in order to consolidate his own power.
The end of Fascism offered an opportunity to develop a new
constitution which might effect a break with the past, including
the pre-Fascist past. But the opportunity was lost, or perhaps
deliberately mislaid, for all the main parties, including the
left, played a part in composing a situation in which the fewest,
rather than the most, opportunities for change, emerged. This
situation developed long before the election of the
Constitutional Assembly. In the Parri government, formed at the
end of the war the PCI, PSIUP and the Action Party (P'dA) had a
majority over the DC, but wanted to ensure that elections would
not be delayed and therefore tried to avoid alienating the DC.
The Allies wanted to delay elections as long as possible, in
order to allow the "lava to cool" and they were not held until
spring 1946. Parri was ousted by a Liberal withdrawal from the
government late in 1945 , and de Gasperi took over in November
with the blessing of the Communists and the Socialists, who were
influenced by Togliatti's mistaken belief that he represented a
progressive force in Italian politics. De Gasperi then pulled
some fast ones: demanding for instance that the Constitutional
Assembly should have no legislative powers and that the decision
over whether Italy would become a republic would be taken in a
referendum. After a good deal of fighting, the left parties gave
way. What held them back, then as earlier, were fears of a crisis
which might culminate in Allied intervention. The election, which
the left believed they could win, would legitimise a new
political order with time enough to undertake reforms; in the
meantime, it behove them to accept de Gasperi's steady hand on
the wheel of the state. This attitude permitted de Gasperi
quietly to consolidate the position of Christian Democrats within
the institutions of government, with the result that the central
administration of the state remained roughly what it had been
under Fascism: a swollen, inefficient hodge-podge of little
islands of political power.
The referendum on the monarchy and the elections to the
Constitutional Assembly were held simultaneously in June 1946.
Ginsborg, op cit, 153 and Chapter 5 passim
(The referendum favoured a republic despite massive support in
the South for the monarchy.) The results of the elections were
as follows;
PARTY ASSEMBLY SEATS PERCENTAGE VOTE
Christian Democrats!DC) 207 35.2
Socialists (PSIUP) 115 20.7
Communists (PCI) 104 19.0
The remaining quarter of votes and seats were divided between
Republicans, the Action Party, the Liberals and a new party, the
Fronte dell'Uomo Qualanque, a populist party with a huge
following in the South.
The CPI and the PSIUP had done well enough between them to force
Gasperi to keep them in the government, but the massive
difference between his party1s support and theirs, when counted
separately, gave him the pretext to exclude the smaller parties
from the government and to replace Communist ministers with
Christian Democrats. Gullo was a significant casualty. This turn
against the left was reinforced by discontent among the Christian
Democrats' most important source of support, the middle classes.
Under the whip of the post-war economic crisis, the middle
classes began gravitating towards the far right, making the
assumption that the crisis was largely due to its coalition with
the left, and the DC lost disastrously in the municipal elections
of November, 1946.
The deputies elected to the Constitutional Assembly on 2 June,
1946, delegated the task to committees dominated by distinguished
academics and lawyers, a number of whom had been associated with
the Liberal Party before the Fascists took power. The
Constitution was something of an anomaly in the seething ferment
of post-war Europe. It was modelled on the "Albertine"
constitution which had been bestowed on Savoy in 1848, and was
basically a design for a rechtstaat onto which elements of
contemporary liberal democracies had been grafted.4 The highly
centralised state, which Napoleon had bequeathed to Italy and
France, were preserved in the 1946 constitution, and hence too
the opportunity to preserve the practices which de Gasperi had
inherited from previous governments. However it was less the
defects in the Constitution itself than the inertia of succeeding
governments in implementing its clauses that impeded it. Many
clauses in the constitution, including the those concerning the
Constitutional Court, had not been given effect by 1953. The
institutions of "extraordinary" regional government in five
regions with special features were retained from previous
constitutions. But the clauses introducing "ordinary" regional
government structures were not implemented until 1973.5 This
4
 For an excellent discussion of the Constitution, cf. John
Clarke Adams and Paolo Barile, The Implementation of the Italian
Constitution, American Political Science Review. Vol 47, No 1,
March 1953, pp 61-83.
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 Sidney Tarrow, Local Constraints on Regional Reform: A
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1974, 2-36.
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meant that the instruments of "extraordinary" regional government
reinforced the effective political autonomy of backward areas
like Sicily, while progressive regions like Tuscany remained
subject to the paralysing hand of the Roman bureaucracy, denied
the creative potentialities of regional autonomy, for over a
quarter of a century.6 (The comparison would be to a federal
constitution in South Africa which bestowed autonomy on KwaZulu,
but not on the Witwatersrand.) Moreover parliament was reluctant
to legislate on matters like local government which would in time
be devolved onto regional government. As a result local
government was badly neglected. The anomalies in the Constitution
included the preservation in the archaic form in which they were
originally written, of the Lateran Pacts which prescribed the
relationship between the Vatican and the Italian state. (Article
26 stated that the Holy See recognised the Kingdom of Italy, the
existence of which had just been terminated in the referendum! )
Fascist censorship laws were retained.
The 1948 election
De Gasperi visited the United States in January 1947 to negotiate
loans, and probably discussed the exclusion of the left with the
State Department. The two left-wing parties to the coalition were
immobilised for much of 1947, partly because of their relatively
poor performance in 1946; partly because they were unable to
develop any fresh policy initiatives. The Communists' position
as an Italian electoral party was compromised by its place in the
international communist movement. Yugoslavia wanted Trieste and
Stalin backed Tito's claims. Moreover the Socialist Party split,
losing nearly half its deputies to the breakaway party. The time
would seem opportune for de Gasperi to get out of the alliance
with the left. However he was constrained by his belief that the
two left parties were indispensable to the political and social
stability of post-war Italy. He delayed making a move as long as
possible, but after a poor showing in the Sicilian regional
elections, his fear that the Church as well as the middle classes
might abandon the Christian Democrats forced his hand. He
resigned in May 1947, but his successor Nitti was unable to form
a government. De Gasperi returned to form a government, enjoying
the support of more than half of the members of the
Constitutional Assembly, based entirely on right-wing parties.
The anti-Fascist alliance had ended with the demotion of the left
to an opposition which had won little, and lost much, as a result
of its attempt to placate the centre in the cause of liberation
and national unity. This development signalled an increase in
levels of repression against working class and peasant protest
and the expulsion of partisans from the security forces.
The Cold War increasingly influenced Italian party politics. The
Comintern criticised Italian and French communists for
conciliating middle class parties. The consequence of the shift
in government policy and in communist strategy could be seen in
the massive agitations among landless peasants in northern Italy.
6
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Their union, Federterra, made significant advances including
limits on the working day and increases in security. However
they received little support from the Communist leadership.
Togliatti found electioneering a more palatable form of political
action than involvement in protest movements, believing that it
was through the ballot box that change would come about. He
concentrated his energies on preparing for the election.
To this end he formed the Democratic Popular Front with the
socialists in order to fight the elections on a common platform.
The election campaign of 1948 was deeply marked by the Cold War.
The United States used the delivery of goods purchased under the
"Interim Aid" programme to advertise the munificence of the
United States, together with the warning from Marshall himself
that future deliveries would halt in the event of a Communist
victory. The delivery of goods was carefully orchestrated into
an anti-Communist programme. Hollywood stars with Italian
backgrounds extolled the virtues of the DC. American prelates
joined the Pope in presenting the conflict as one between Stalin
and God, a theme echoed by the Christian Democratic Party. In the
elections the DC won nearly half of the votes, while the Popular
Front dropped nearly 8% compared to the combined vote in the
elections for the Constitutional Assembly.
PARTY ASSEMBLY SEATS PERCENTAGE VOTE
Christian Democrats (DC) 305 48.5
Popular Front 265 31,07
However it was the decline in support for the Socialist Party,
not the CPI, that accounted for the drop in support for the
Popular Front. They returned only 41 deputies compared with 115
in 1946. The PCI considerably improved its position in 1948,
compared with 1946, returning 140 deputies, compared with 106 in
1946. Italian politics was beginning to exhibit the pattern of
polarisation between right and left which it has subsequently
displayed, and which has worked to keep the Communists in
opposition. The failure to change the social profile of the state
bureaucracy, or to reform its structure, placed major obstacles
in the path to reform, and entrenched the major impediments to
reforms. The land reform in particular, but also reforms in the
industrial arena, were blocked and diverted by hostile elements
in the military, the police, judiciary, and other branches of
government.
The inertia on these issues was reinforced by the ideology and
organisation of the Christian Democrats, and the way this
affected policy and administration. The party's deliberate
attempt to forge cross-class alliances led in practice to
factionalism, and severe struggles over resources.
The Christian Democratic Party was a moderately successful
variant on the model of the post-war conservative party which
survives or flourishes through its capacity to generate support
from among the broad classes and strata of industrial society.
Like other variants it was able to do so through a combination
of appeals to core values in the society - family and religion -
and through its capacity to deliver definite benefits to its
clients. The most important organisation through which the DC
reached into the working class and the peasantry was the Catholic
lay organisation Azione Cattolica. The instruments through which
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it delivered benefits to peasantry, working class and small
artisans and businessmen were the Coldiretti and the Association
of Italian Christian Workers (ACLI). Through these Catholic
workers and peasants were provided with insurance, social
assistance, and legal help. Its ideology stressed family values,
the authority of the Church, anti-communism and pro-capitalism.
However, there were tensions between its right and left wings.
The Vatican would sometimes prod it towards a more authoritarian
position, while its left wing presented it as a reformist and
anti-capitalist force. De Gasperi exhibited the ability of the
successful conservative leader by holding the centre against both
of these extremes, while being able to move rapidly in one or the
other directions when it suited him. It is worth noting that the
Communists tried to counter the Christian Democrats1 attempt to
exploit the values of family morality. The women's union
associated with the CPI, Unione delle Donne Italiane, attempted
to counter this through slogans like "for a happy family, for
peace and for work". But it was difficult for them to counter the
ferocious propaganda of the Church, especially after a Communist
deputy had (against a party decision) tried to have a debate on
the issue of divorce.
The conservative hegemony was in part ensured by the adroit
manoeuvres of the Christian Democrats, and their allies in the
Vatican, who took advantage of the deep religious conservatism
of the peasantry to mobilise support against the Communists while
creating "openings to the left" during the 1950s which enabled
them to mount a counter-mobilisation which neutralised the
parties of the left. But it was a possibility which was enhanced
by the ideology of the Communist Party.
Togliatti interpreted Gramsci's notion of the war of position to
involve the development of a mass party, ie the building of
alliances and the development of hegemony in society (rather than
a vanguard party). This deeply influenced the strategy and
tactics of, and produced some crucial turning points in post-war
Italian politics. For instance, at the war end, the Action Party,
tried to establish the partisans as the core of a "new
democracy". The CPI refused to support this on the grounds that
it would invite Allied intervention. This position was justified
among radical workers on the grounds that the strategy of
doppiezza involved the postponement, not the abandonment of
revolutionary aspirations, and that gaining a foothold in
existing institutions would enhance the ultimate objective.
The historian Paul Ginsborg, has suggested that the Communists'
"two-stage strategy -- liberation first, social and political
reform second — caused them to dissipate the strength of the
Resistance and of worker and peasant agitation. As a result, they
were completely outflanked by the Allies and by the conservative*
forces in Italian society."7 Ginsborg suggests that the problem
was the displacement of a reformist strategy by the commitment
to national unity, and not the replacement of a revolutionary
project by a reformist one.
Some of the long-term socio-economic and political consequences
Paul Ginsborg, op cit p 47.
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of the immobility of Italian politics will briefly be sketched.
The most important was the perpetuation, indeed the
intensification of the sharp inequalities between northern
industrial centres and the south, both rural and urban through
Italy's economic "miracle" and beyond. During this period, there
was a massive migration from the south to the industrial north:
in the course of this Turin became known as the biggest southern
city in Italy.
Yet there was only limited economic or industrial growth in the
south, despite large-scale state intervention. There was some
industrialisation in the south, notably around Naples, where Fiat
established a plant. But the resources for economic development
in the south were largely channelled through the patron-client
linkages which Christian-Democratic hegemony perpetuated. The
most important industrial development that took place in and
around Naples, for instance, was in building construction via the
networks established by the Gava machine within the Christian
Democratic Party, which lasted until the Communists won the local
elections there in 1975. These networks distributed construction
contracts to local firms. (A member of the Gava family had been
present at the formation of the DC in 1943, and there was a Gava
in ministerial office in Rome for almost the entire subsequent
period, providing the conduit for the flow of patronage to
Naples. {The Gava machine dominated local politics through crude
offers such as "a pair of shoes: one before, one after the
election.")
A malign cycle worked to perpetuate patron-clientelism,
unemployment and poverty. Neapolitans had voted overwhelmingly
for monarchists in the 1946 elections for the Constitutional
Assembly, in support of the long tradition which linked limited
employment opportunities to court favours. The local electorate
maintained this support until the central government removed the
monarchists from office by decree in 1958. Machines like the
Gava perpetuated the same kind of politics.
Naples was inundated with immigrants from its impoverished rural
hinterland, but there was little economic growth which could
provide them with jobs. Judith Chubb suggested that southern
cities were characterised by "urbanisation without
industrialisation", the identical term that Bauer used to
describe urbanisation in west Africa during the 1950s.8
Unemployment in Naples during the 1970s ran at about 25%; an
additional 25% were under-employed. The massive influx placed a
strain on services and infra-structure. The cholera outbreak of
1973 drew attention to the fact that the sewerage system had
remained unchanged since 1888, though the population had doubled
since 1945. The levels of infant mortality have remained at
almost double the national average.
The widening gap inequalities was most visible between north and
south, but it was also evident within regions in the most
affluent parts of the country. Raphael Zariski and Susan Welch
noted a moderate inverse relationship between economic
modernisation and depolarisation in the North-West which Tarrow
8
 Judith Chubb, Naples under the Left: the limits of local
change, Comparative Politics, October, 1980, pp 53-78.
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explains as a result of greater inequality, greater problems of
transport and provisions of facilities and services, and a
greater gap between private-sector efficiency and public-sector
inefficiency.9 The long-term political consequence was the
maintenance of a sharp polarity between left and right, and the
exclusion, except for a period during the 1970s, of the
Communists from political office.
The Italian experience at the end of the second world war and
after provides an instance of a liberation struggle which
confronted the state and the dominant social and political order
with the prospect of a radical alternative, without however
commanding the political resources to carry that project through.
The consequence in that case was the installation of a centrist
coalition with domestic and international backing which skilfully
balanced the contending forces in the society, conceding
something, but also denying much, to each of them, and in the end
retaining the reins of power in its own hands.
It also showed how difficult it is for a liberation movement to
launch alternative political projects on the basis of a mass
mobilisation, and the difficulties of translating discontent and
insurrection into a political project sustainable over time,
capable of overtaking or transforming key political institutions.
This difficulty seems to be particularly acute if there are
elections in prospect; mobilisation for change does not seem to
converge on the processes required for successful electioneering.
Different perspectives will find different elements which provide
the decisive explanation for the outcome of the Italian
situation: the international environment; the Catholic Church;
the Italian genius for compromise which has characterised its
politics since the risorgimento.
The feature which I find most illuminating is the continuity in
the state, and the persistence of its bureaucratic structures
through a period of intense upheaval and turmoil. Within these
continuities the most important are the continuities in control
and purpose within the security forces. These continuities are
prominent features in the two other cases, Kenya and Zimbabwe,
which will be considered in the subsequent sections of this
paper.
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9
 The Correlates of Intraparty Depolarising Tendencies in
Italy: A Problem Revisited, Comparative Politics, April 1975,
406-433.
